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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Michie Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court correctly granted defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Appellate Court reviews 
the District Court's decision for correctness. Sanderson v. First 
Security Leasing, 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). 
2. Whether the District Court correctly granted defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Appellate Court reviews the 
District Court's decision for correctness. Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 
306. 
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it 
entered the Scheduling Order which mandated that all discovery be 
completed by December 31, 1992. The Appellate Court reviews the 
District Court's actions for abuse of discretion. Berrett v. 
Denver and Rio Grande W.R. . 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it 
refused to grant plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to 
Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation. The Appellate Court 
reviews the District Court's actions for abuse of discretion. 
Berrett, 830 P.2d at 293. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative: (1) 29 
U.S.C.A. § 793(b) (West Supp. 1993); (2) 29U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 
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Supp. 1993); (3) 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (A) WestSupp. 1993); (4) 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1993); (5) 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1144(a) (West 1985); (6) Utah Code Ann. § 34-45 - 6 (1) (a) (i) 
(Michie Supp. 1993); (7) Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Michie 
Supp. 1993); (8) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (Michie 1988); (9) Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(1) (Michie 1992); and (10) Utah Code Jud. 
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(b) (Michie 1993). In accordance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(6), these provisions are set out verbatim in the 
addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff has appealed from inter alia, (1) the District 
Court's grant of defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and his rulings related thereto; (2) the District Court's grant of 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and his rulings related 
thereto; (3) the District Court's setting of the discovery cutoff 
date; and (4) the District Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for 
Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation. See 
Plaintiff's Brief. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
A. Complaint. 
On June 15, 1990, plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. R.2-19. Plaintiff 
asserted five causes of action, all of which are related to the 
cessation of his employment with defendant E-Systems. R.2-19. 
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B. Legal representation of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was represented by L. Zane Gill at least from the 
time he filed his Complaint on June 15, 1990 until August 6, 1991, 
when Gill withdrew as plaintiff's counsel of record. R.2, 156. 
Plaintiff was represented by David K. Isom and Associates from 
sometime prior to September 18, 1991 until March 22, 1992, when 
that firm withdrew as plaintiff's counsel of record. R.325, 390. 
C. Discovery. 
On July 11, 1990, plaintiff served on defendants his extensive 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, which consisted of "87 separate detailed interrogatories 
and 31 detailed requests for production of documents." Plaintiff's 
Brief at 44; R.21. On September 26, 1990, defendants fully 
responded thereto. R.68. On September 10-13, 1990, defendants 
deposed plaintiff. R.100-111. On December 6, 1991, plaintiff 
served his Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents on defendants. R.306. On January 24, 1992, defen-
dants fully responded thereto. R.3 66. 
D. Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendants' Counsel. 
On November 26, 1991, plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify 
Defendants' Counsel. R.285, 288. On December 9, 1991, defendants 
filed their opposing memorandum. R.307. On December 19, 1991, 
plaintiff filed his reply memorandum. R.336. On February 4, 1992, 
plaintiff filed a supplemental supporting memorandum. R.368. On 
February 28, 1992, a hearing was held on plaintiff's Motion, and 
the District Court denied that Motion. R.391, 384, 394. 
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E. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
On September 25, 1991, defendants filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R.164-253. On October 28, 1991, the parties 
stipulated that plaintiff would be allowed until November 5, 1991 
within which to respond thereto, and the District Court signed an 
Order to that effect. R.254, 258. Defendants later agreed to 
extend this deadline to November 8, 1991. R.327. On November 8, 
1991, plaintiff filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time Within Which 
to File a Rule 56(f) Motion. R.258. On November 12, 1991, the 
District Court signed an Order granting plaintiff until November 
12, 1991 within which to file a 56(f) motion. R.283. On November 
12, 1991, plaintiff filed a 56(f) motion. R.265, 268. On November 
27, 1991, the District Court, based on the stipulation of the 
parties, signed an Order which provided that the discovery 
plaintiff claimed to need in order to respond to the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment be completed by January 31, 1992 and that 
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment be filed by January 31, 1992. R.304-05. On 
February 10, 1992, the District Court, based on the stipulation of 
the parties, signed an Order which extended the foregoing deadlines 
and provided that the discovery needed to respond to the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment be completed by March 16, 1992 and that 
plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition tc the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment be filed by March 16, 1992. R.3 04-05. Dspite 
these many extensions of time to complete discovery and to file a 
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Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' Motion, plaintiff never 
filed an opposing memorandum. 
Thereafter, on April 14, 1992, defendants filed a Notice to 
Submit their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Decision. 
R.399. On June 9, 1992, the District Court approved oral argument 
on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, instructed defendants' 
counsel to notice the matter on the court's Friday law and motion 
calendar, and sent copies of the Approval for Oral Argument to the 
parties. R.405. On June 12, 1992, defendants noticed the hearing 
on June 19, 1992. R.406-408. On the afternoon of June 18, 1992, 
plaintiff sent, via facsimile, a letter to the clerk of the 
District Court requesting that the hearing on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment be rescheduled. R.409. On June 19, 1992, 
the hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was held, at 
which the District Court granted defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's first, third, fourth, 
and fifth causes of action with prejudice. R.416, 420-22. 
Plaintiff did not participate in the hearing. R.416. 
F. Scheduling conference. 
On June 19, 1992, the District Court, on its own motion, 
ordered that a scheduling conference be held on August 3, 1992. 
R.414. On August 3, 1992, a scheduling conference was held. 
R.423. Plaintiff and counsel for defendants attended the hearing. 
The District Court discussed relevant cutoff dates with the parties 
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and set a discovery cutoff of December 1, 1992 and a dispositive 
motion cutoff of January 4, 1993. R.423.1 
G. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On December 31, 1992, defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R.425-525. On January 14, 1993, plaintiff filed a 
letter with the District Court, without sending a copy to counsel 
for defendants, requesting it to allow him to respond to the Motion 
via facsimile on January 19, 1993. R.526. On January 15, 1993, 
defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. R.527. On 
January 19, 1993, plaintiff apparently sent the District Court a 
letter, again without sending a copy to counsel for defendants, 
requesting it to allow him to respond to the Motion via facsimile 
on January 22, 1993. R.581. On January 23, 1993, plaintiff sent 
the District Court, via facsimile, a Response to Defendants' Motion 
and Notice to Submit for Decision.2 On February 3, 1993, 
defendants' filed a reply memorandum. R.530. On February 16, 
1993, the District Court directed that a Minute Entry be made in 
which it granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. R.539-40. On 
the same day (February 16, 1993), plaintiff filed: (1) a Motion 
for Continuance and for Leave to Complete Discovery, R.542; and 
(2) a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
1
 The scheduling order, which was prepared by the trial 
court's clerk, mistakenly states that the dispositive motion cutoff 
was January 4, 1992; however both parties were present at the 
scheduling conference at which the correct dates were discussed and 
confirmed. R.423. 
2
 This Response was never filed and thus was not made part 
of the record. 
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. R.545. On February 18, 
1993, defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance and for Leave to Complete Discovery. R.593. On that 
same day (February 18, 1993) the District Court made a second a 
Minute Entry reaffirming its earlier ruling granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R.590-91. On February 23, 1993, defendants sent 
plaintiff: (1) a proposed Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.610-612; and (2) a proposed Judgment in favor 
of defendants dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice, and 
awarding defendants costs. R.623-24. On March 1, 1993, plaintiff 
filed Objections to Defendants' Draft Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Proposed Judgment. R.597. On 
March 2, 1993, defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff's 
Objections to Defendants' Proposed Order and Form of Judgment. 
R.606. On March 9, 1993, the District Court signed the Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Judgement 
in favor of defendants dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice 
and awarding defendants costs. R.610-11. On March 16, 1993, 
defendants filed a Motion to Tax Costs and a Verified Memorandum of 
Costs. R.626, 628. 
H. Plaintiff's Deposition. 
In May 1993, it came to the attention of defendants' counsel 
that the transcript of plaintiff's deposition had inadvertently not 
been filed with the District Court. Consequently, on June 7, 1993, 
defendant filed a Motion to File Plaintiff's Deposition and Modify 
the Judgment. The District Court denied the Motion to Modify the 
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Judgment, but ordered that: (1) the original transcript of 
plaintiff's deposition be filed as of July 9, 1993 and unsealed as 
previously provided by the Court's granting of defendants' 
September 25, 1991 Motion to Publish the Plaintiff's Deposition; 
and (2) pursuant to Utah R. App, P. 11(h) the record be clarified 
to show that the original transcript of plaintiff's deposition was 
inadvertently not filed but that, in connection with their Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, defendants provided the Court with 
courtesy copies of the pages of plaintiff's deposition on which 
they relied in support of that Motion, and it is the District 
Court's practice to review such deposition pages provided to it as 
courtesy copies in connection with its consideration of motions. 
See Order and Statement of Proposed Changes to the Record, a copy 
of which is included in the addendum to this Brief.3 
III. STATEMENT OP FACTS. 
Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant E-Systems. At all 
times relevant to this action, plaintiff was employed at E-Systems 
Montek Division in Salt Lake City; he held the title of Director of 
Procurement. Plaintiff had no written employment contract and was 
employed for an indefinite period of time. The principal business-
es of E-Systems' Montek Division, located in Salt Lake City, are 
the design, development and manufacture of hydraulic, electrohydra-
ulic, and electromechanical flight controls systems for commercial 
and military aircraft and the design and development of various 
3
 While this Order is not technically part of the record at 
this trial, defendants believe the Court of Appeals should be aware 
of it. 
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electronic systems used for navigation and air traffic control. 
R.479. Defendant Williams is the Vice President and General 
Manager of E-Systems' Montek Division. R.478. Defendant Buchanan 
is the Director of Human Resources of E-Systems' Montek Division. 
R.224. 
During the time plaintiff was employed at E-Systems, the 
Montek Division worked on various contracts with other business 
entities, including General Electric, Northrop, and Hazeltine, 
Corp. 
On June 18, 1986, a meeting was held to discuss organizational 
changes which were being considered, as part of a cost cutting 
initiative, by the Montek Division. R.479. Plaintiff and 
defendant Williams, among others, participated in this meeting. 
R.480. During the course of the meeting, plaintiff became very 
upset, hostile, and abusive because he disagreed with the decisions 
which were being made by the rest of the group. R.480-81. A short 
time after the meeting ended, plaintiff met with defendant Buchanan 
and Jim Cocke, the Director of Finance at the Montek Division, and 
gave them a memorandum entitled "Letter of Resignation," which 
tendered plaintiff's resignation unless the Company yielded to 
plaintiff's demands. R.481-82, 585. Defendant Buchanan, Mr. 
Cocke, and Defendant Williams met to discuss the situation and 
decided to accept plaintiff's resignation as tendered. R.482. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court correctly granted defendant's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. The Appellate Court cannot consider 
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plaintiff's arguments related to this Motion because they were 
never raised before the District Court; therefore, plaintiff has 
failed to show that the District Court erred in granting that 
Motion. Even if the Appellate Court were to consider plaintiff's 
argument, it still must affirm the District Court's granting of 
this Motion because the District Court correctly dismissed with 
prejudice the four causes of action addressed in this Motion for 
the following reasons: (A) plaintiff's first cause of action is 
barred by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act as a matter of law; (B) 
plaintiff's third cause of action fails because a claim for breach 
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not 
recognized by Utah law in the employment context, and there is no 
genuine issue as to whether E-Systems established an express 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (C) plaintiff's fourth 
cause of action is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act as a matter of law; and (D) plaintiff's fifth cause of 
action fails because there is no admissible evidence in the record 
which would allow plaintiff to establish key elements of this 
claim. Further, this claim is preempted by the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
II. The District Court also properly granted defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. The undisputed facts 
are that plaintiff's employment ended as a result of his submission 
of his Letter of Resignation, which was accepted by E-Systems. 
Further, even if plaintiff had been discharged from his employment, 
he would have no claim that his termination violated a clear and 
substantial public policy of this State. Finally, in response to 
defendants' Motion, plaintiff offered no admissible evidence in the 
record showing the existence of any triable issue of material fact. 
III. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
set the discovery cutoff date. The Appellate Court must assume 
that the District Court properly exercised its discretion when it 
set the discovery cutoff date unless the record clearly shows to 
the contrary. Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing. 
IV. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied plaintiff's belated Motion for Extension of Time. The 
Appellate Court must assume that the District Court properly 
exercised its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Motion for 
Extension of Time unless the record clearly shows to the contrary. 
Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Appellate Court Cannot Consider Plaintiff's Arguments 
Related To Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Because They Were Never Raised Before The 
District Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
repeatedly held that they will not consider issues on appeal which 
were not raised before the District Court, See, e.g.. Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982) ("This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were 
not submitted to the District Court . . . . " ) ; State v. Castner, 
825 P.2d 699, 705 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("We will not consider 
an argument on appeal unless it was raised at the District 
Court."); LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 482-84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In the instant case, none of plaintiff's arguments opposing 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which plaintiff 
now asserts for the first time in his Brief, were raised before the 
District Court, and the District Court did not have an opportunity 
to rule on them. Therefore, these arguments cannot be considered. 
Turtle Management, 645 P.2d at 671; Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 n.4; 
LeBaron, 823 P. 2d at 482-84. There is no justification for 
departure from this rule in the instant case. Plaintiff had more 
than ample opportunity to respond to the Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment and to make arguments opposing the Motion before the 
District Court; he simply failed to do so.4 
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to show that the District 
Court erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
and the District Court's decision must be affirmed. 
B. The District Court Correctly Dismissed With Prejudice The 
Four Causes Of Action Addressed In Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
Even if the Court of Appeals could consider plaintiff's 
arguments now attacking the granting of defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, it still must affirm the District Court's 
4
 Prior to the trial court's ruling on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, plaintiff, while represented by counsel, 
conducted extensive discovery. See discussion on discovery above. 
For nearly six months after defendants filed their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel 
at the time, was repeatedly granted extensions to complete 
discovery related to that Motion and to respond to that Motion. 
R.254, 258, 327, 304-05. Plaintiff conducted discovery, R.306; 
however, he never responded to the Motion. On April 14, 1992, one 
month after the expiration of plaintiff's final extension, 
defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and sent a copy of 
the Notice to plaintiff. R.399, 402. On June 9, 1992, the trial 
court approved oral argument on defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, instructed defendants' counsel to notice the 
matter on the court's Friday law and motion calendar, and sent 
copies of the Approval for Oral Argument to the parties. R.405. 
On June 12, 1992, defendants noticed the hearing for June 19, 1992 
and sent notice of the hearing date to plaintiff. R.406-408. On 
the afternoon before the hearing was scheduled to take place, 
plaintiff, despite having had nearly two months notice that a 
hearing on the Motion would be held, sent, via facsimile, a letter 
to the clerk of the trial court requesting that the hearing on 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be rescheduled. 
R.409. The trial court went ahead with the hearing on June 19, 
1992 (nearly nine months after defendants filed their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment) at which it granted defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's first, 
third, fourth, and fifth causes of action with prejudice. R.416, 
420-22. Plaintiff did not participate in the hearing in person or 
via telephone. R.416 
65154 -13-
ruling because, as the following discussion shows, the District 
Court's ruling was proper. 
1. Plaintiff's first cause of action (breach of public 
policy against employment discrimination of the 
disabled). 
In his Complaint's first cause of action, plaintiff alleges 
defendants violated public policy by terminating him because of his 
disability. R.ll. Id.5 
The District Court correctly dismissed this claim with 
prejudice because it is barred by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
("UADA").6 
5
 Plaintiff also claims that Utah public policy requires 
all employers receiving federal financial assistance to comply with 
the requirements of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. R.10. 
Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that the federal 
Rehabilitation Act is somehow incorporated into Utah State public 
policy. In any event, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is inappli-
cable to the instant case because defendant E-Systems does not 
receive and has not received, at any time relevant to this action, 
"federal financial assistance," which is required under § 504. 
R.222; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Therefore, plaintiff's claim related to 
§ 504 fails. 
In his Brief, plaintiff for the first time invokes § 503 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Section 503 cannot support 
plaintiff's claim. First, there is no private right of action 
under § 503. Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 728 
F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1984) cert, denied. 469 U.S. 822 (1984). 
Second, § 503 preempts "a qualified handicapped individual's claim 
under state law as a third party beneficiary of the affirmative 
action clause contained in contracts between his employer and the 
federal government." Howard v. Uniroyal. Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1555 
(11th Cir. 1983) . Third, plaintiff offers no support for the 
proposition that the federal Rehabilitation Act is somehow 
incorporated into Utah State public policy. Finally, plaintiff 
points to no admissible evidence in the record which supports the 
key factual allegations related to this claim. 
6
 As noted above at § I.A., none of plaintiff's arguments 
related to his fourth cause of action should be considered because 
plaintiff did not raise those arguments oelow. 
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The UADA provides the exclusive remedy under state law for 
employment discrimination based on handicap; therefore, the UADA 
bars all common law claims for employment discrimination based upon 
handicap, including plaintiff's first cause of action. Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Michie Supp. 1993); Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992). 
In the instant case, under the indispensable element test, 
which the Utah Supreme Court adopted in Retherford, plaintiff's 
first cause of action is preempted by the UADA because the UADA 
addresses employment discrimination based on handicap, which is a 
necessary element of plaintiff's claim. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 
965.; Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (Michie Supp. 1993). 
Indeed, plaintiff's proposed public policy claim is indistin-
guishable from the claim found to be barred in Retherford. In that 
case, the plaintiff relied upon the UADA's express prohibition of 
"retaliation" against persons complaining of discrimination as the 
basis for her "public policy" claim. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 965. 
Here, plaintiff relies upon the prohibition against "handicap" 
In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
defendants established through admissible evidence the underlying 
material facts which supported their Motion. See R.5-7. Plaintiff 
failed to specifically controvert these material facts in an 
opposing memorandum; therefore, these facts are deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment. Utah Code Jud. Admin. R.4-
501(2) (b). Even if these material facts were not deemed to be 
admitted, plaintiff has failed to point out any admissible evidence 
in the record which could now be used to controvert the material 
facts upon which defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
was based. 
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discrimination. Plaintiff's claim is thus foreclosed for the very 
reasons articulated in Retherford.7 
2. Plaintiff's third cause of action (breach of cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing). 
In his third cause of action, plaintiff alleges he was forced 
to resign arbitrarily and without good cause in violation of a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R.14. 
The District Court correctly dismissed this claim with 
prejudice for the following reasons.8 First, a claim for breach 
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not recog-
nized by Utah law in the employment context. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55-56 (Utah 1991); Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Second, there is no genuine issue as to whether E-Systems 
established anything that plaintiff now would call an "express" 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.9 In support of his 
7
 Courts in other jurisdictions have also uniformly refused 
to recognize a public policy common law claim where a statutorily-
created administrative process provides a remedy for the underlying 
injury, even in the absence of an express exclusive remedy 
provision. See e.g. . Poison v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705, 709 (10th Cir. 
1990) (holding that Kansas would not recognize a public policy 
wrongful discharge claim based on a statutorily-created public 
policy prohibiting employment discrimination where administrative 
remedy available); Jones v. Indus. Elec.-Seattle. 768 P.2d 520, 522 
(Wash. App, 1989) (no public policy wrongful discharge claim for 
retaliatory discrimination where statute provides administrative 
remedy). 
See note 6 above. 
9
 Again, plaintiff should not be permitted to declare and 
respond to defendant's Motion in the lower court, and now re-
characterize his claim on appeal. 
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argument that there is such an issue, plaintiff relies entirely on 
defendants' responses to plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories. 
See Plaintiff's Brief at 28-30, Plaintiff's reliance on those 
responses is misplaced because: (1) those responses are not even 
properly before this Court; (2) plaintiff mischaracterizes some of 
those responses;10 and (3) those responses could not be the basis 
for any conclusion that E-Systems established an "express" covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing with plaintiff. Therefore, 
plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to this fact. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 
Therefore, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's 
second cause of action with prejudice. 
3. Plaintiff's fourth cause of action (breach of 
contract). 
In his breach of contract claim, plaintiff alleges defendant 
Buchanan failed to provide plaintiff with conversion forms 
necessary to convert his health and life insurance to individual 
insurance policies. R.7-9. 
The District Court correctly dismissed this claim with 
prejudice because it is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA"). 
ERISA preempts all state laws, including private causes of 
action, which "relate to" any "ERISA-governed employee benefit 
plan." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 
10
 See, e.g.. plaintiff's characterizations of defendants' 
responses to interrogatories 32, 54, and 58 on pages 29 and 30 of 
plaintiff's Brief. 
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Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux. 481 
U.S. 41, 45, 54 (1987). "'A law 'relates to' an employee benefit 
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection 
with or reference to such a plan.'" Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 474, 484 (1990) 
(quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97). In short, any state statute, 
state common law claim, or regulation which refers to or has a 
connection with an ERISA-governed plan is preempted by ERISA. 
In McClendon, the Supreme Court held that a state common law 
claim, which asserted that an employee was unlawfully terminated to 
prevent the attainment of rights under an employee benefit plan, 
was explicitly preempted by ERISA because it made reference to and 
was premised on the existence of an ERISA-governed employee 
benefits plan, and thus it "related to" that plan. Id. at 484-86. 
The Court held that the state common law claim was also impliedly 
preempted by ERISA because it conflicted directly with ERISA due to 
the fact that is was essentially a claim under ERISA Section 510, 
which prohibits interference with an employee's rights or attain-
ment of rights under a plan. Id. at 486-87. 
In the instant case, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is 
expressly preempted by ERISA. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim 
is premised entirely upon the alleged failure of defendant Buchanan 
to provide plaintiff with conversion forms necessary to convert his 
health and life insurance to individual insurance policies.11 R.7-
11
 Even though plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he 
was entitled to a one-on-one "exit interview" with Buchanan, he has 
failed to identify anything he would have gained out of such an 
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9. The duty to provide plaintiff with the conversion forms arises 
out of and is wholly dependent on the E-Systems Health Care and 
Weekly Income Disability Plan and the E-Systems Pru-opt Plan,12 
both of which are "welfare benefit plans" under ERISA.13 See 29 
U.S.C.A § 1002(1) (A) (West Supp. 1993) (expressively defining 
"welfare benefit plans"). Definition of "Welfare Benefit Plan" 
quoted above. Therefore, plaintiff's breach of contract claim, 
like the common law claim in McClendon, "relates to" ERISA-governed 
employee benefit plans and is explicitly preempted by ERISA.14 See 
interview other than an insurance conversion form. 
12
 The procedure for converting to an individual hospital 
and surgical expense policy is set forth in E-Systems' Health Care 
and Weekly Income Disability Plan as follows: "Application for the 
individual policy must be made and the first premium paid within 31 
days from the termination of the Plan coverage . . . . A form to 
be used for this purpose will be furnished by the benefits office." 
R.236 (Exhibit A to Buchanan Affidavit at 14) . Similarly, the 
procedure for converting to an individual life insurance policy 
upon termination is set forth in E-Systems' PRU-OPT Plan as 
follows: "You must obtain a conversion form from the Benefits 
office and take it, along with your certificate of Pru-Opt 
coverage, to the nearest Prudential office for processing within 31 
days of your termination date." R.242, 248 (Exhibit B to Buchanan 
Affidavit at 3, 15). 
13
 In his brief, plaintiff attempts to avoid preemption by 
arguing that his breach of contract claim arises solely from 
defendants' failure to fulfill contract obligations which arose out 
of company policy and oral covenants. Id. This argument fails for 
the following two reasons. First, as the discussion in the main 
text of this brief illustrates, the duty defendant Buchanan 
allegedly breached arose out of ERISA-governed employee benefit 
plans; therefore, plaintiff's claim "relates to" those plans and is 
preempted by ERISA. Second, plaintiff has failed to point to any 
admissible evidence in the record which could support a finding 
that there were such contract obligations which arose out of 
company policy or any oral covenants. 
14
 Plaintiff's claim related to the PRU-OPT plan also fails 
on the merits because the plan provides that it is the responsi-
bility of the plan participant to "obtain a conversion form from 
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also Pilot Life, supra, 481 U.S. at 57 (state common law tortious 
breach of contract suit asserting improper processing of claim for 
benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan preempted by ERISA); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987) (state 
common law contract and tort suit asserting improper denial of 
benefits, mental anguish, wrongful termination, and retaliation in 
connection with an ERISA-regulated insurance plan preempted by 
ERISA) . 15 
In sum, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by 
ERISA as a matter of law; therefore, the District Court was correct 
in dismissing that claim with prejudice. 
4. Plaintiff's fifth cause of action (infliction of 
emotional distress)• 
In his fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges defendants' 
conduct caused him to incur mental and emotional suffering. R.16. 
the Benefits office and take it, along with your certificate of 
PRU-OPT coverage, to the nearest Prudential office for processing 
within 31 days of your termination date." R.248 (emphasis added). 
15
 Plaintiff's claim is also impliedly preempted by ERISA 
because, like the plaintiff in McClendon, plaintiff here is 
attempting to assert what is at bottom an ERISA claim through a 
state common law cause of action. Plaintiff asserts that defendant 
Buchanan and others, who are responsible for supplying "conversion" 
forms in accordance with the terms of the ERISA-governed employee 
benefit plans at issue, failed to provide him such forms. R.7-9. 
Section 404 of ERISA requires plan fiduciaries (persons who 
administer the terms of employee benefit plans) to administer 
employee benefit plans in accordance with the terms of the plans 
themselves. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) 'West Supp. 1993). Conse-
quently, plaintiff's breach of contract claim falls squarely within 
the ambit of ERISA Section 404; therefore, it conflicts with ERISA 
and also is impliedly preempted by ERISA. 
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The District Court correctly dismissed this claim with 
prejudice because: (a) there is no admissible evidence in the 
record which would allow plaintiff to establish key elements of 
this claim; and (b) this claim also is preempted by the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act as a matter of law.16 
a. Lack of admissible evidence in the record as 
to key elements of this claim. 
i. Outrageous conduct. 
A plaintiff claiming infliction of emotional distress must 
prove, inter alia, that the defendant engaged in conduct which was 
so "outrageous and intolerable [as to] offend against generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality." Samms v. Eccles, 358 
P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961). The Samms "outrageous and intolerable 
standard should be interpreted in light of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 46, comment d (1965), which states: 
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been 
so outrageous in character, so extreme in degree, as to 
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community. 
. . . . It has not been enough that the defendant has 
acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, 
or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or 
even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice, " 
or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the 
plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. 
Amos v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop. 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1029 (D. Utah 
1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Thus, 
the requirement that the defendant's conduct be outrageous and 
intolerable is a substantial one. This is further illustrated by 
See note 6 above. 
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the types of conduct in the workplace which courts applying Utah 
law have held does not rise to the necessary level of outrageous -
ness .17 
Whether the conduct in which a defendant has engaged rises to 
the necessary level of "outrageousness" is a question of law for 
the court to decide. See Sperber v. Galligher Ash Co,, 747 P.2d 
1025, 1028 (Utah 1987) (affirming summary judgment on ground that 
conduct was not outrageous enough to support action for infliction 
of emotional distress); Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co.. 712 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (D. Utah 1989). 
In the instant case, plaintiff simply makes wholly conclusory 
and unsupported allegations related to the conduct in which he 
claims defendants engaged. See Plaintiff's Brief at 36-41. 
Plaintiff has failed to point to any admissible evidence in the 
record which would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that 
defendants engaged in outrageous conduct, and thus, has failed to 
raise any genuine issues as to this factual element of his claim. 
17
 See e.g.. Jenks v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1708, 1720-22 (D. Utah 1989) (supervis-
or's racial slurs, jokes, and other rude and non-sympathetic 
behavior toward the plaintiff was not outrageous); Maxfield v. 
North Am, Philips Consumer Elec. Corp.. 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. 
(BNA) 442, 446 (D. Utah 1989) (supervisor's statement that the 
plaintiff must sell 120% of his quota and that he would see to that 
the plaintiff could not do so was not outrageous) ; Sperber. 747 
P.2d at 1028 (wrongful discharge and lying to employee about 
reasons for discharge was not outrageous) ; Amos v. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop. 618 F. Supp. 1013, 1029 (D. Utah 1985) 
(discriminatory discharge which caused embarrassment, distress, and 
humiliation was not outrageous), rev'd in part on other grounds. 
483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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Therefore, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's 
infliction of emotional distress claim with prejudice. 
ii. Severe emotional distress as a result of 
de f endan t s' conduc t. 
A plaintiff claiming infliction of emotional distress must 
also prove, that he or she actually suffered "severe" emotional 
distress as a result of the defendant's conduct. Samms, 358 P.2d 
at 347. 
Whether a plaintiff suffered "severe" emotional distress as a 
result of the defendant's conduct is also a question of law for the 
court to decide. See, Jenks, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 
1721-22 (dismissed emotional distress claim because, inter alia, 
the plaintiff had not established that the distress she suffered as 
a result of the defendant's actions was severe emotional distress); 
Poison v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1151 (D. Kan. 1986) (dismissed 
emotional distress claim because plaintiff failed to establish 
"that the emotional distress she suffered was so severe that no 
reasonable person should be expected to endure it"), aff'd on other 
grounds. 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990). 
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any 
admissible evidence in the record which could support a reasonable 
finding that he suffered "severe" emotional distress as a result of 
defendants' conduct.18 Therefore, the District Court correctly 
18
 In his brief, plaintiff argues that defendants, in their 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
"admit that [plaintiff] sought medical treatment for his severe 
emotional distress in May of 1989." Plaintiff's Brief at 41. This 
is false. Defendants stated that plaintiff testified that he did 
not seek medical treatment for his alleged emotional distress until 
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dismissed plaintiff infliction of emotional distress claim with 
prejudice. 
b. Plaintiff's infliction of emotional distress 
claim is barred by the Utah Workers' Compensa-
tion Act as a matter of law* 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act bars claims by employees 
against their employers or co-workers for intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress unless the employer or co-worker 
actually intended that the employee be injured. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-60 (Michie 1988); Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) (damages arising from the plaintiff-em-
ployee's claims of intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress could only be compensated under the workers' 
compensation scheme unless the plaintiff-employee could prove that 
the defendant-employer directed or intended the act which allegedly 
caused the plaintiff-employee emotional distress);19 Lantz v. 
after his neck surgery in May of 1989, nearly three years after he 
left E-Systems. R.215. This is not an admission plaintiff 
actually did seek medical treatment for his "severe emotional 
distress" in May of 1989. Furthermore, even if plaintiff could 
point to admissible evidence in the record to prove that he sought 
medical treatment for emotional distress in May of 1989, that is 
far short of the required showing that his emotional distress is 
severe and a result of defendants' conduct. See Eklund v. Vincent 
Brass & Aluminum Co.. 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(employee who consulted physician because of nervous condition and 
psychologist because of stress did not establish severe emotional 
distress). 
19
 In his Brief, plaintiff argues that in Mounteer v. Utah 
Power & Light Co. , 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991) and Bryan v. Utah 
Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court "made it 
absolutely clear that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act does NOT 
bar a claim by an employee against an employer for intentional 
infliction emotional distress." Plaintiff's Brief at 38. This 
argument misses the point. As the discussion in the main text of 
this brief illustrates, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act does bar 
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National Semi-Conductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . See also Star v. Industrial Comm'n. 615 P.2d 436, 437 (Utah 
1980); Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1047, 1049-50 (D. Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, plaintiff has pointed to no admissible 
evidence in the record that the defendants deliberately intended to 
injure plaintiff; therefore, plaintiff's infliction of emotional 
distress claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, and the District Court correctly 
dismissed that claim with prejudice. 
a claim by an employee against an employer - for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress unless the employer actually 
intended that the employee be injured. Mounteer directly supports 
this interpretation. See discussion the main text of this brief. 
Bryan also supports this interpretation. In Bryan. the plaintiff 
employee sued his employer and a co-worker for injuries he received 
when the co-worker intentionally and with malice aforethought 
started his pickup intending to jerk a cable against the plain-
tiff's body. Bryan, 533 P.2d at 892. The court held that the 
Workers' Compensation Act did not bar the plaintiff's suit against 
the co-worker for damages which resulted from the co-worker's 
intentional act by which he intended to injure the plaintiff. Id. 
at 894. The court held that the plaintiff's claim against his 
employer was barred by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act because 
there was no evidence that the injurious act was directed or 
intended by the employer. Id. at 894-95. 
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In sum, the District Court correctly dismissed plaintiff's 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action with prejudice; 
thus it correctly granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, and its ruling should be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND ASSERTED CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff claims he was 
terminated from his employment in violation of an asserted public 
policy "against fraudulent business activities." R.ll. Plaintiff 
alleged that he was terminated because of his actions in connection 
with three separate E-Systems contracts, the General Electric 
contract, the Northrop actuator contract and the Hazeltine 
contract. R. 12-13 .20 
A. Plaintiff's Public Policy Allegations Fail to State a 
Claim Under Utah Law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of a fundamental public policy. The Court 
has repeatedly emphasized, however, that this is a narrow exception 
to the at-will employment rule. Such claims must be based upon 
"substantial and important public policies." Berube Fashion Centre 
20
 As the following argument shows, the District Court 
properly granted defendants' Motion in part because, as the Court 
noted in its second Minute Entry, "[Plaintiff's] statements are 
purely conclusory and Mr. Penney has offered no admissible evidence 
to support these conclusions." R. 591. Defendants will rely upon 
plaintiff's deposition in the following argument only for the 
purpose of explaining why his submissions are indeed conclusory and 
lacking in foundation: Because plaintiff lacks any personal 
knowledge to support his claim. Even without considering 
plaintiff's deposition testimony, however, it is clear that the 
District Court properly dismissed his public policy claim. 
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Ltd. 771 P. 2d 1033, 1042 (emphasis in original). See also 
Peterson V. Browning 832 P.2d 1280, 1283, 1285-86 (Utah 1992) 
(same). In cases of employee termination, public policy is to be 
derived from: (1) legislative enactments which "protect the public 
or promote public interests;" and (2) judicial pronouncements. 
Berube, supra, 771 P.2d at 1043. 
It is a plaintiff's burden to demonstrate, first, that he was 
involuntarily terminated and second, that the termination "impli-
cate [s] a clear and substantial public policy." Heslop v. Bank of 
Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 1992). As the materials before the 
District Court demonstrate, plaintiff could establish neither of 
these elements. 
1. The Undisputed Material Facts Before the District 
Court Show that Plaintiff Resigned Prom His Employ-
ment. 
In their affidavits supporting their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, defendants established that plaintiff was not discharged 
but instead resigned from his employment. In 1986, defendant David 
Williams was General Manager of the Montek Division of E-Systems. 
R.478 (Affidavit of David A. Williams 1 1). During 1984, 1985 and 
1986 the Montek Division undertook a number of organization and 
cost-cutting initiatives to improve Division performance. One of 
the organizational changes being considered was the reassignment of 
the traffic and receiving function from the materials organization, 
which was managed by the plaintiff, to the manufacturing organiza-
tion. R.479 (Id. 1 4). 
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On June 18, 1986, a meeting was held to review the progress of 
this initiative and to discuss it among the involved parties. In 
addition to Mr. Williams, the meeting was attended by Mr. Jim 
Cocke, the Vice President of Finance, who was the plaintiff's 
supervisor. Also at the meeting were two other Directors for the 
Company, including Mr. Ed Head, Director of Manufacturing. R.479-
80 (Id. 1 5) . 
When it became apparent in the meeting that a decision would 
likely be made to reassign the shipping and receiving function to 
the manufacturing department, the plaintiff suddenly embarked on a 
lengthy monologue on the contributions that he had made to the 
Division and on his superior management capabilities. During the 
course of his monologue, plaintiff became very hostile and abusive. 
He suggested that the management of the Division was incompetent 
and that he was much better qualified to perform management 
functions than those presently given the responsibility. His 
immediate supervisor, Mr. Jim Cocke, cautioned him several times to 
refrain from personal attacks and to concentrate on the issues at 
hand; Mr. Cocke indicated to plaintiff that his behavior was 
insubordinate and inappropriate. Instead of responding to Mr. 
Cocke's suggestions, plaintiff continued to be abusive and hostile, 
at which time Mr. Williams ended the meeting, indicating that we 
would address resolution of the issues in a separate meeting. 
R.480-81 (Id. 1 6)21 
21
 Plaintiff's own account of this meeting in his deposition 
does not materially differ from the foregoing. He acknowledged in 
his deposition that (1) during the course of the meeting, plaintiff 
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Later the same day, Mr. Penney requested a meeting with Mr. 
Cocke, who invited Mr. Buchanan, Employee Relations Director, to 
attend the meeting as well. At that meeting, the plaintiff 
presented to Mr. Cocke a memorandum entitled "Letter of Resigna-
tion." R.481-82 (Id. 1 8) . It is undisputed that the plaintiff 
drafted the Letter of Resignation and that he submitted it to Mr. 
Cocke. Id. That letter lists a number of demands for support 
which plaintiff states he "must have as a minimum." The Letter of 
Resignation goes on to state: 
"I hereby submit my resignation in advance if I cannot 
layout and implement a scheduled plan to reduce division 
cost to a level that we pre-establish. The effective 
date of my resignation is . 
If you elect not to fill in today's date, I will be glad 
to discuss the plan, with supporting facts and documents 
at your convenience." R.471, 585. 
Following the meeting with the plaintiff, Mr. Cocke discussed 
the Letter of Resignation with Mr. Williams and Mr. Buchanan. They 
jointly decided that the best course of action was to accept the 
resignation as tendered, by filling in "today's date," which Mr. 
Cocke did. R.481-82 (Id. 1 8). 
In his First Affidavit, apparently to avoid the effect of his 
own actions, plaintiff refers to the Letter of Resignation 
began "debating" with Williams over the issue of the proposed 
transfer, prompting Cocke, plaintiff's immediate supervisor, to 
warn plaintiff that he was "talking to the General Manager," PI. 
Depo. at 250; (2) during the meeting while plaintiff "was involved 
in a very emotional discussion with Williams . . . [Cocke] was 
interrupting . . . , trying to put on a show for Dave [Williams] , " 
Id. at 255; and (3) plaintiff believed that his immediate supervi-
sor, Mr. Cocke, "didn't know what he [Cocke] was talking about," so 
plaintiff ignored Cocke's warning and continued debating with 
Williams. Id. at 250. 
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(attached to his First Affidavit as Exhibit F-l (R.585)), as a 
"Letter of Recommendation." R. 575-76. Plaintiff cannot change 
the legal effect of his own actions simply by trying to rename the 
document he submitted. Nor can he turn his resignation into a 
discharge simply by claiming, after the fa^t, that he did not have 
"any intention to resign." Id. The legal effect of submitting a 
Letter of Resignation with a blank date, and informing his superior 
that he was free to fill in the blank date of resignation with 
"today's date," was that plaintiff effectively resigned from his 
job. That is particularly true where the only alternative to 
accepting the Letter of Resignation offered to Mr. Cocke by 
plaintiff was to negotiate with plaintiff regarding what support 
the plaintiff "must have as a minimum" to continue to do his job. 
In sum, plaintiff's belated contention in his First Affidavit 
that he was discharged instead of quitting his job created no 
triable issue of fact in connection with his separation from 
employment. Therefore, plaintiff cannot make out the threshold 
requirement of a claim for discharge from employment in violation 
of public policy. 
2. Plaintiff Did Not Identify the Basis for Any Sub-
stantial and Important Public Policy Implicated by 
His Alleged Termination. 
While plaintiff's Complaint alleges he was terminated in 
violation of a "Public Policy Against Fraudulent Business Activi-
ties," in the District Court plaintiff never identified any 
legislative enactments or other grounds on which this alleged 
public policy would be based. Moreover, though plaintiff appears 
to claim that he was asked to participate in or facilitate fraud in 
connection with two of the contracts mentioned in his Complaint, he 
did not set out the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud 
with particularity, as required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure.22 
In Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 
the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that in order to prove the 
tort of discharge in violation of public policy, the plaintiff must 
show that the employer discharged him or her "in a manner or for a 
reason that contravened a 'clear and substantial public policy' of 
the state of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or 
statutes." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966 (quoting Peterson, 832 P.2d 
at 1281), The Court explained in more detail as follows: 
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear 
and substantial" to support a cause of action for discharge in 
violation of public policy, one must examine the strength of 
the policy as well as the extent to which it affects the 
public as a whole. The very words "clear and substantial" 
require a lack of ambiguity on both points. As the majority 
of this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in 
a statute are not expressions of public policy. Many statutes 
merely regulate conduct between private individuals or 
"'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate 
fundamental public policy concerns.'" (citation omitted). 
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a 
statute embodies a clear and substantial public policy. 
First, one must ask whether the policy in question is one of 
overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the 
parties only. Second one must inquire whether the public 
interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty that 
we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, 
22
 As explained below, plaintiff does not even claim he was 
asked to do or participate in anything fraudulent in connection 
with the General Electric contract. Rather, he alleges he 
"reported" an improper billing practice in connection with that 
contract. No evidence in the record, however, supports that claim. 
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thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot 
modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining 
power, (citation omitted). 
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966 n.9. 
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations about "fraudulent business 
activities" do not satisfy the standards articulated in Retherford. 
No specific public policy of "overarching importance" against 
dishonesty or misrepresentation in the business world exists. 
Rather, persons and organizations in business relationships have 
private, contractually enforced economic rights and interests which 
they also are free to waive and compromise by agreement. One 
cannot, moreover, by inquiring into any public policy, begin to 
determine what the parties may have permitted or forbidden to each 
other in their private agreements. Indeed, fraud claims arising 
out of complicated contractual relationships are always intimately 
connected to the private agreements or course of dealings between 
the parties. Accordingly, because public policy in this area does 
not supply any standards articulable and enforceable independently 
of the parties' own private agreements, it should not be used as a 
basis for creating a wrongful discharge cause of action. 
Finally, should Utah courts ever recognize some "overarching" 
public policy against business fraud or dishonesty, it should be 
strictly limited to cases where actual fraud, pled with particular-
ity and proven by clear and convincing evidence, can be made out.23 
23See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.. 832 P.2d 62, 
66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting fraud requires proof by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
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Plaintiff's pleading and evidence offered to the District Court 
fall far short of such a showing.24 
For these reasons, Count II of plaintiff's Complaint was 
properly dismissed. 
B. In Response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff Failed to 
Identify Any Triable Issues of Material Fact Precluding 
Summary Dismissal of His Claim* 
In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, supra, the Supreme Court identified 
two additional elements of a public policy wrongful termination 
claim:25 
(2) The employer must violate the pertinent public 
policy "by requiring the employee to engage in 
conduct violating the policy or by punishing con-
duct furthering the policy"; and 
(3) Violation of the public policy must be a 
"substantial factor" in the plaintiff's termina-
tion. 
Id., 839 P.2d at 837. The District Court also properly dismissed 
plaintiff's claim because he failed to raise any triable issue in 
connection with these second two elements of a public policy claim. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgement on Count II, 
defendants offered three affidavits. See R.472-85. Through the 
Motion and those supporting affidavits, defendants satisfied their 
burden under Rule 56 to demonstrate that no triable issue of 
24The District Court was entitled, in this connection, to apply 
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof when assessing 
plaintiff's ability to prove the elements of fraud. See, Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (in ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence through "the 
prism" of the party's evidentiary burden). 
25
 The first two elements, discussed above, are that the 
plaintiff be terminated and that his termination "implicate a clear 
and substantial public policy." Heslop, supra. 839 P.2d at 837. 
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material fact precluded entry of judgment in defendants' favor on 
Count II. In response, plaintiff offered no admissible evidence, 
but only conclusory allegations. 
1. No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with 
the General Electric Contract. 
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgement, defendants 
established the following material facts in connection with the 
General Electric contract: 
The contract with GE was a "firm fixed price" contract awarded 
to E-Systems in 1976, under which E-Systems was to design and 
manufacture earthquake shock suppressors for use in nuclear power 
plants built by GE and others. R.486 (Johnson Affidavit 1 2) . 
In order to meet the lead time requirements of the customer 
(GE) , E-Systems purchased mill runs of nuclear certified raw 
material for use on that contract. R.486-87 (Id. at 1 4) . To 
protect E-Systems from the risk of making these advanced purchases, 
GE agreed to pay for the material. Id. It was understood by 
E-Systems, however, that any residual material remaining at the end 
of the contract would be owned by E-Systems, as it would be in any 
other firm fixed price contract. Id. E-Systems never billed GE 
for the use by E-Systems of any materials owned by GE. R.487 (Id. 
at 1 6). In other words, E-Systems never double-billed GE for any 
materials. Id. 
Neither plaintiff nor Still ever mentioned the issue of GE 
being double-billed to anyone, including Johnson and Williams, the 
General Manager. R.487, 483 (Johnson Affidavit 1 5; Williams 
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Affidavit 1 10) . Mr. Still had no responsibility for pricing or 
invoicing on the GE contract. R.487 (Johnson Affidavit 1 5). 
The events leading up to plaintiff's resignation had nothing 
to do with the GE contract. R.479-82 (Affidavit of David Williams 
11 4-8) . 
Plaintiff's only evidentiary response to these material facts 
in the District Court are paragraphs 16 and 17 of the First 
Affidavit of William V. Penney. See R.576, 539-40. Plaintiff's 
wholly conclusory statements in those paragraphs, that some 
materials purchased for the GE contract were "knowingly, illegally 
and/or improperly used" by E-Systems and that he reported this 
"knowing, illegal and/or improper use" to someone at E-Systems did 
not raise any issue of material fact. Plaintiff's statements in 
his First Affidavit are wholly lacking in foundation, because, as 
he conceded in his deposition, he had no personal knowledge of the 
General Electric contract and did not actually "report" any alleged 
impropriety to anyone.26 
26
 According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, he has no 
personal knowledge of whether General Electric was, in fact, 
"double-billed" for any material on any General Electric contract. 
PI. depo. at 402-08, 414. Indeed, plaintiff admitted in his 
deposition that he knows virtually nothing about the General 
Electric contract. Id. Plaintiff's Affidavit also lacks any 
foundation on this issue precisely because, as he acknowledged in 
his deposition, he did not "report" any alleged impropriety 
regarding the General Electric contract to anyone. Rather, 
plaintiff's testimony was that Mr. Still allegedly told plaintiff 
that he thought General Electric was being billed for material it 
had already paid for. According to plaintiff's testimony, after 
Mr. Still allegedly told him this, he stated to Still: "that [is] 
an extremely dangerous-type situation especially in that product 
line." Plaintiff's depo. at 415. Plaintiff never said or did 
anything else in response to these alleged statements by Still. 
65154 -35-
The District Court thus properly concluded that "These 
statements are purely conclusory and Mr. Penney has offered no 
admissible evidence to support these conclusions." R.591. See 
Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 1991) (pro 
se plaintiff's conclusory statements in affidavit created no issue 
of material fact regarding his public pclicy discharge claim),27 
2. No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with 
the Northrop Contract. 
Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Northrop contract also fail 
because, in response to the admissible evidence offered by 
defendants through their Motion, plaintiff again responded only 
with conclusory allegations. In connection with the Northrop 
contract, defendants established, inter alia, the following facts: 
In 1985, Northrop had a contract with the United States Air 
Force to build an aircraft. In 1984, E-Systems submitted a 
proposal to Northrop which anticipated a firrr, fixed price sub-
contract under which E-Systems was tc build an actuator (a 
hydraulic device used to operate moving parts on an aircraft). In 
May 1985, Northrop awarded the subcontract to E-Systems for the 
supply of actuators, and E-Systems commenced work on that contract. 
R.487-88 (Johnson Affidavit 1 7). 
The Northrop Contract was bid and subsequently signed as a 
firm fixed price contract in May 1985. R.487-88, 518 (Id. 11 7, 9; 
27See also, Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 
(plaintiff's statements in affidavit were conclusory in form and 
accordingly not admissible in evidence and could not defeat summary 
judgement motion); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) 
(affidavit reflecting affiant's opinions and conclusions insuffi-
cient to raise issue of material fact precluding summary judgment). 
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Exhibit A thereto, document control no. P200354). Under a firm 
fixed price contract, the ultimate contract price is agreed to and 
fixed at the time the contract is entered into. R.488 (Johnson 
Affidavit 1 10) . In contrast, under a cost-plus contract, the 
price is determined based on a contractor's actual cost, plus an 
agreed-upon profit margin. Id. 
Under a firm fixed price contract, sourcing changes (e.g.. 
purchasing contract items from outside vendors rather than making 
them in-plant) are customarily made by the seller (here, E-Systems) 
without notice to the government. Sourcing changes have no impact 
on the firm fixed price charged by the seller because, regardless 
of the source of manufacture, the seller is always paid only the 
firm fixed price on which the parties to the contract originally 
agreed. R.489 (Id. at 1 12). 
Under the terms of the Northrop Contract, E-Systems was free 
to either make the parts for the "actuators" within its own plant 
or purchase them from outside vendors, so long as the other 
contract requirements (e.g. technical performance and schedule) 
were met. R.489, 520 (Id. at 1 11 and Exhibit "A" thereto, 
document control no. P200356). 
When the Northrop contract was originally bid in 19 84, certain 
parts were planned to be made by E-Systems within its own plant; 
however, as the design of the program evolved, sourcing was 
reviewed and revised, and some of the sourcing for such parts was 
changed from being made by E-Systems in its own plant to being 
purchased from outside vendors. R.489 (Id. at 1 12) . Such 
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sourcing changes are customarily made in order to accommodate 
technical considerations, schedule, shop loading, cost, etc, of the 
contractor. Id. 
Northrop was fully aware of all sourcing changes made under 
the Northrop contract because in approximately March 198 7, Northrop 
representatives audited the costs associated with the Northrop 
contract in order to establish a negotiation position for subse-
quent requirements it entered into to purchase more actuators from 
E-Systems. R.490 (Id. at 1 13). 
In July 1988, E-Systems properly invoiced Northrop for the 
tooling in accordance with E-Systems' government property control 
systems, which was set up to specifically comply with Federal 
Acquisition Regulations. R.490, 522-25 <Ld. at 1 14 and Exhibit 
"B" thereto) . Both the Federal Government's Property Administrator 
and Northrop's Property Administrator have audited and signed off 
on E-Systems' tooling list every year since 1986. R490 (Id. at 
1 15) . 
In response to this admissible evidence regarding the Northrop 
contract, plaintiff again responded only with foundationless, 
conclusory allegations that are not admissible evidence and raised 
no triable issue of material fact in the District Court.28 It is 
28Plaintiffs' First Affidavit simply declares that: "Defendan-
ts' involuntary termination of Plaintiff was, at least in part, a 
result of Plaintiff's informing Defendant E-Systems' management 
that Defendants, contrary to the terms of the Northrop Contract and 
without Northrop's knowledge or consent, subcontracted out the work 
of producing actuators for Northrop, knowingly, illegally and/or 
improperly made representations to Northrop that certain of said 
actuators had been manufactured, and knowingly, illegally and/or 
improperly accepted progress payments, based on said representa-
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not surprising that plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and lack 
foundation, because the auditing and invoicing of the Northrop 
contract did not even occur until 1987 and 1988, long after June 
1986 when plaintiff's employment with E-Systems ended. See R.490 
(Johnson Affidavit 11 13, 14) .29 Further, absolutely nothing in 
the record evidence relating to events preceding plaintiff's 
resignation could support an inference that his employment was 
terminated because of any alleged improprieties in connection with 
the Northrop contract. See R.479-82 (Affidavit of David Williams 
11 4-8) . 
3. No Triable Issue of Fact Existed in Connection with 
the Hazeltine Contract. 
With respect to the Hazeltine contract, defendants estab-
lished, in support of their Motion, the following facts: 
1. In 1984, the Federal Aviation Administration ("F.A.A.") 
awarded Hazeltine a contract to develop certain electronic airplane 
guidance equipment. R.473-74 (Ausman Affidavit 1 3). In January 
1984, Hazeltine awarded E-Systems a subcontract to build precision 
tions, for certain tools necessary for making actuators when said 
tools had not yet been manufactured." First Affidavit of William 
V. Penney, 1 18; R. 576-77. 
29
 Moreover, in his deposition plaintiff acknowledged that 
he has virtually no personal knowledge about the Northrop contract. 
PI. depo at 424-29. Plaintiff has no personal knowledge of when 
the Northrop contract was awarded (id. at 424-25), whether it was 
a firm fixed price or a cost-plus contract (id. at 425, 427), or 
whether E-Systems ever informed Northrop that the tooling and tools 
were being purchased from outside vendors (.id. at 428) . In 
addition, plaintiff admitted he had no personal knowledge of 
whether Northrop ever paid for tools or tooling that were not 
actually obtained for the contract by E-Systems and, in fact, does 
not believe anyone at E-Systems was trying to cheat Northrop on the 
"tooling" work done under the contract. Id. at 438, 435. 
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distance measuring equipment ("PDME") for Hazeltine's use on its 
contract with the F.A.A., and E-Systems started work on the PDME. 
Id. At that same time (January 19 84), the contract price for E-
Systems' work (approximately $11 million) was set. Id. 
The Hazeltine contract was bid, negotiated, and signed as a 
firm fixed price contract. R.474 (Id. at 1 4) . Under a firm fixed 
price contract, the ultimate contract price is agreed to and fixed 
at the time the contract is entered into. R.474 (Id. at 1 5) . The 
contract price stays the same unless there is a change in the scope 
of the work to be performed under contract. There was no change in 
the scope of the work to be performed by E-Systems under the 
Hazeltine Contract. R.474 (Id. at 1 6) . Although it was a 
development contract and the bill of material changed, thereby 
increasing the cost of certain items to E-Systems, the price never 
changed (i.e., this just resulted in a decrease of E-Systems' 
profit margin). Id. 
In connection with the Hazeltine contract, plaintiff claims 
that Williams had both plaintiff and another company "price" a part 
of the electronic materials to be used in that contract. R.13-14. 
This process involves creating a "bill of materials" that itemizes 
the cost of materials needed for the contract. Plaintiff alleged 
Williams told him that he wanted to use the material costs set out 
in a "bill of materials" by the other firm (which were higher) for 
negotiations with Hazeltine and the F.A.A. and use plaintiff's 
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costs for the materials (which were lower) for division budget 
reporting to the Corporation. Id.30 
In response to defendants' specific facts, however, plaintiff 
again offered only conclusory allegations. See R.577 (First 
Affidavit of William V. Penney H1 19-21). There is absolutely no 
foundation in the record for these statements by plaintiff, 
Further, conclusory allegations about obtaining "funny numbers" to 
use "knowingly, illegally, and/or improperly" fall far short of the 
specific facts and clear and convincing proof required for a 
showing of fraud.31 See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 
832 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting fraud requires proof 
by clear and convincing evidence). 
In addition, plaintiff's allegations also do not make sense in 
light of the fact that the Hazeltine contract was a firm fixed 
price contract. In such a contract, the price cannot be changed 
unless the scope of the contract is changed. Yet it is undisputed 
that the scope of the Hazeltine contract never changed, nor did the 
price. Moreover, the contract price for the Hazeltine contract was 
set in 1984. Therefore, in order for E-Systems somehow to benefit 
30Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition, however, that he 
did not believe, at the time he allegedly spoke to Williams about 
the Hazeltine contract, that Williams or any one else at E-Systems 
was intentionally violating any law or regulation. Plaintiff's 
depo at 449-50. 
31
 Again, it is not surprising that plaintiff resorts to 
conclusory allegations because, as he acknowledged in his deposi-
tion, he has no personal knowledge about whether anyone at 
E-Systems ever did commit fraud, and he does not actually believe 
anyone at E-Systems intended to commit fraud. PI. depo. at 314-16, 
435, 438. 
65154 -41-
from the conduct which plaintiff apparently alleges, that conduct 
would have to have occurred before the contract was awarded to 
E-Systems in 1983, and not in 1986, as plaintiff apparently 
asserts. 
Finally, plaintiff's allegations regarding the Hazeltine 
contract also fail because, as with the other two contracts, they 
were entirely unrelated to the reasons plaintiff's employment with 
E-Systems ended.32 See e.g.. Hamman 910. F.2d 1417, 1420-21 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (in public policy wrongful discharge case, plaintiff 
must prove causal connection with more evidence than showing of her 
refusal to act, her discharge, and the timing between the two 
events). 
The District Court properly concluded that these conclusory 
allegations failed to raise any triable issue of material fact in 
connection with Defendants' Motion. 
32
 Note also that plaintiff cannot even maintain that the 
transfer of the traffic function from his department to the 
manufacturing department, which was the subject of the meeting 
immediately preceding his resignation, was an improper decision. 
Plaintiff conceded that the General Manager, David Williams, had 
the right to make that decision. PI. depo. 245-46. Plaintiff also 
acknowledged that the transfer of the traffic function was a 
"management decision" about which reasonable people could disagree. 
Id. at 338. Further, a transfer of some functions away from the 
plaintiff's department would appear to be exactly what was needed, 
given his complaints about working excessive overtime in 
plaintiff's Letter of Resignation. 
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4. The District Court Also Properly Rejected 
Plaintiff's Belated and Conclusory Allegations 
Regarding Two Other Alleged Projects. 
In his February 16, 1993 First Affidavit, plaintiff also 
attempted to assert for the first time that his employment with E-
Systems was terminated because of "Plaintiff's refusal to partici-
pate in the amoral and illegal KAL Project." R.577. Plaintiff also 
asserted for the first time that his "involuntary termination by 
Defendants was, at least in part, a result of Plaintiff's unwill-
ingness to overlook or ignore Defendants' knowing, illegal and/or 
improper conduct regarding the Dolphin Castings." R.577-78. 
These belated and conclusory allegations were not made in 
plaintiff's Complaint or prior to the filing of plaintiff's First 
Affidavit, after defendants' Motion had already been submitted for 
decision and the Court had, in its first Minute Entry, granted 
defendants' Motion.33 
The District Court properly concluded that these allegations 
also lacked any foundation and did not create any triable issue of 
fact in connection with plaintiff's loss of employment at E-
Systems. 
For the reasons, the District Court properly granted 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed plaintiff's 
public policy claim with prejudice. 
33Throughout his lengthy deposition, in which plaintiff 
testified at length regarding his claims, plaintiff never testified 
that he was terminated because of either of these projects; he 
never even mentioned either project. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SET 
THE DISCOVERY CUTOFF DATE. 
On June 19, 1992, more than two years after plaintiff filed 
his Complaint, the District Court, on its own motion, ordered that 
a scheduling conference be held on August 3, 1992. R.18, 414. On 
August 3, 1992, a scheduling conference was held. R.423„ 
Plaintiff and counsel for defendants attended the hearing. The 
District Court discussed relevant cutoff dates with the parties and 
set a discovery cutoff of December 1, 1992. R.423 
The Appellate Court must assume that the District Court 
properly exercised its discretion when it set the discovery cutoff 
date unless the record clearly shows to the contrary. Donohue v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); 
Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) . Furthermore, considerable weight should be given to the 
District Court's setting of the discovery cutoff date due to the 
District Court's close involvement with the parties and total 
circumstances of the case. Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 
(Utah 1974) . 
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any 
evidence in the record which shows the District Court abused its 
discretion when it set the discovery cutoff date. 
Plaintiff's allegation that he has not had adequate opportuni-
ty to complete discovery is untrue. Plaintiff had from June 15, 
1990 to December 1, 1992 (nearly two-and-one-half years) to conduct 
discovery. See R.18, 423. In fact, plaintiff conducted extensive 
discovery during that time. Specifically, plaintiff served on 
defendants two separate sets of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents, the first of which consisted of "87 
separate detailed interrogatories and 31 detailed requests for 
production of documents." Plaintiff's Brief at 44; R.21; R.306. 
Defendants fully responded to both sets of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents. R.68; R.366.34 
Plaintiff argues that the District Court's reasonably 
extending the time to complete discovery would not have prejudiced 
defendants; however, at the Scheduling Conference, the District 
Court did reasonably extend the time to complete discovery - he 
gave plaintiff an additional four months to complete discovery. 
R.423. 
Plaintiff's references to his illness, pro se status, and move 
to Texas fail to support his argument. Plaintiff was represented 
and assisted by local counsel for nearly one-and-one-half years. 
R.2, 156, 325, 390. Also, plaintiff maintains a local address and 
apparently spends a significant amount of time in the Salt Lake 
34
 In his brief, plaintiff alleges that defendants did not 
properly respond to plaintiff's interrogatories and document 
requests and failed to make themselves available for deposition. 
Plaintiff's Brief at 48-49. These allegations are conclusory, 
completely unsupported, and simply wrong. Defendants fully 
responded to both sets of plaintiff interrogatories and requests 
for production of documents, R.68, 3 66, and both defendant 
Buchanan's and defendant Williams' depositions were scheduled by 
plaintiff while he was still represented by counsel, but were re-
scheduled at the request of plaintiff's counsel and were never re-
noticed. In any event, the appropriate method for addressing these 
allegations is through a motion to compel under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
Contrary to plaintiff's representation, he never served upon 
defendants a motion to compel discovery. In fact, plaintiff never 
even raised these allegations before the trial court; therefore, 
they should not be considered by the Appellate Court. See 
discussion above at § I.A. 
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City area. R.592. Furthermore, plaintiff does not claim that he 
has been incapacitated at all times since the date he commenced 
this law suit or since the date of the scheduling conference. 
Indeed, his behavior since receiving defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment indicate that despite the foregoing considerations, 
plaintiff has been quite active in pursuing his lawsuit. See, 
e.g. , R.542-589, 597-605, 613-622; Docketing Statement; Plaintiff's 
Brief. 
In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
setting the discovery cutoff date; therefore, the District Court's 
action should be affirmed. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REFUSED TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
COMPLETE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL PREPARATION. 
On February 16, 1993, after all of the allowed briefing 
related to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment had been 
completed, see Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(1); R.425-525, 530, 
and two months after defendants filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision, R.527, the District Court directed that a Minute Entry be 
made in which it granted the Motion for Summary Judgment. R.53 9-
40. On the same day (February 16, 1993), plaintiff filed: (1) a 
Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial 
Preparation, R.542; and (2) a Memorandum in Opposition to Defen-
dants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
R.545. On February 18, 1993, defendants filed a Response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and for Leave to Complete 
Discovery. R.593. On that same day (February 18, 1993) the 
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District Court made a second a Minute Entry reaffirming its earlier 
ruling granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. R.590-91. 
As noted above, the Appellate Court must assume that the 
District Court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to 
grant plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary. Donohue. 748 P.2d at 1068; Matter 
of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d at 433. 
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to point to any 
admissible evidence in the record which clearly shows the District 
Court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's Motion for 
Extension of Time. 
Plaintiff's argument that the District Court never entered a 
ruling granting or denying his Motion for Extension is misplaced. 
There was no need for the District Court to do so because 
plaintiff's Motion was untimely. See discussion above. Further-
more, plaintiff has not cited to any authority for the proposition 
implicit in his argument that the District Court must make a formal 
ruling on all untimely motions. 
Plaintiff's argument related to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) also is 
misplaced because plaintiff never moved for additional time under 
this rule,35 and the cases which plaintiff cites in support of this 
argument are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.36 
35
 Even had plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) , 
he could not have meet his burden of showing that he had not had 
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. See discussion above. 
36
 See Strand v. Assoc. Student of U. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1977) (the plaintiff only had one month to conduct discovery 
in general and four days to conduct discovery related to the 
In short, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time; therefore, the 
District Court's action should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully request the 
Court of Appeals to affirm: (1) the District Court's granting of 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) the District 
Court's granting of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) 
the District Court's entering of the Scheduling Order which 
mandated that all discovery be completed by December 31, 1992; (4) 
the District Court's refusal to grant plaintiff's Motion for 
Extension of Time to Complete Discovery and Trial Preparation; and 
(5) any other judgments, decisions or orders of the District Court 
from which plaintiff has appealed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [b day of August, 1993. 
£/f&~s 
DAVID A. ANDERSON ' 
PAUL E. DAME 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
affidavit upon which the motion was based, and the plaintiff filed 
an affidavit which conformed with the requirements of Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f)); Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984) (the defendant 
had not responded to plaintiff's discovery requests, and the 
plaintiff filed an affidavit which met the requirements of Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(f)); Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 
1977) (the party requesting more time to conduct discovery had 
received no response to his discovery requests). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793(b) (West Supp. 1993). 
(b) Administrative enforcement; complaints; investiga-
tions; departmental action. 
If any individual with a disability believes any contractor 
has failed or refused to comply with the provisions of a 
contract with the United States, relating to employment of 
individuals with disabilities, such individual may file a 
complaint with the Department of Labor. The Department 
shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take 
such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, 
consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws and 
regulations applicable thereto. 
2. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1993). 
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations. 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, as defined in Section 706(8) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any 
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by 
the United States Postal Service. The head of each such 
agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary 
to carry out the amendments to this section made by the 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation 
shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of 
the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier 
than the thirtieth day after the date on which such 
regulation is so submitted to such committees. 
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3. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (A) (West Supp. 1993). 
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or 
benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation 
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or 
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal 
services, or (B) . . . 
4. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1993). 
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments 
governing the plan insofar as such documents and 
instruments are consistent with the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter, 
5. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985). 
(a) Supersedure; effective date. 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the 
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this 
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan described in Section 1003(a) of this title and not 
exempt under Section 1003(b) of this title. This section 
shall take effect on January 1, 1975. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) (Michie Supp. 1993). 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or 
promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate any person, 
or to retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in 
matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and 
conditions of employment against any person otherwise 
qualified, because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, 
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if 
the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion, 
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor 
candidate for any job or position may be considered 
"otherwise qualified," unless he possesses the 
68067 2 
education, training, ability, moral character, 
integrity, disposition to work, adherence to reasonable 
rules and regulations, and other job related 
qualifications required by an employer for any 
particular job, job classification, or position to be 
filled or created; 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (Michie Supp. 1993). 
The procedures contained in this section are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination based upon race, color, sex, 
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-
related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (Michie 1988). 
Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or 
employee - Occupational Disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin," heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because 
of arising out of his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon 
any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing 
in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or 
his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial 
commission of Utah for compensation in those cases 
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended. 
3 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(2) (b) 
(Michie 1993)• 
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numoered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All 
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement* 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(1) (Michie 
1993) • 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, 
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages 
in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the 
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application 
is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application 
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if 
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application 
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
4 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of 
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit 
the matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (1)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and 
file a reply memorandum within five days after service of 
the responding party's memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be 
in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall 
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, 
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 900903522 CV 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
On February 28, 1992 the Court denied plaintiff's Motion 
to Disqualify Counsel. The Court recalls that it instructed 
Counsel for defendant to prepare an order reflecting the Court's 
ruling. In reviewing the file the Court notes that said Order 
has not yet been submitted for the Court's signature. 
In addition the Court has before it a Motion for 
Withdrawal of Counsel filed by plaintiff's Counsel. The Court 
has granted said Motion and has signed the Order submitted in 
connection with the Motion for Withdrawal but hereby instructs 
Counsel, David K. Isom, to serve upon plaintiff a notice to 
UUOJUi ri<\ \ 
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appoint Counsel or appear in person consistent with our rules of 
practice. 
DATED this day of March, 1992. 
0U03(J2 
PENNEY V. E-SYSTEMS PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this 03> day of March, 1992: 
-^
p-
David K. Isom 
J. Preston Stieff 
DAVID K. ISOM & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1680 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David A. Anderson 
Paul E. Dame 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
P. O, Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
William V. Penney 
Plaintiff 
709 West Busk, Suite A-101 
Rockwell, Texas 75087 
^ )<? ^ m tc,\ yk'&fo^ 
UU03M 
DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081) 
PAUL E. DAME (5683) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, ) 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL 
vs. ) 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware ) 
corporation, DAVID A. ) 
WILLIAMS, ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, ) Civil No. 900903522CV 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Counsel came on for 
hearing before the Court on February 28, 1992. Plaintiff was 
represented by David K. Isom and J. Preston Stieff of David K. 
Isom & Associates, P.C., and defendants were represented by David 
A. Anderson of Parsons Behle & Latimer. The Court having 
reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and other materials submitted 
by the parties, and having heard the arguments of counsel, now 
being fully advised in the premises, and having issued its oral 
Thlr- Edicts' District 
n.;;.2 ti32 
ruling denying plaintiff's Motion on the grounds that plaintiff 
has failed to prove that Parsons Behle & Latimer formerly repre-
sented him or that confidential information was transmitted to 
Parsons Behle & Latimer by plaintiff, and the Court having fur-
ther concluded that plaintiff has waived his right to bring the 
instant Motion by filing it untimely, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's 
Motion to Disqualify Counsel should be and is hereby denied. 
ENTERED this ^S day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL to the following on this / day 
of March, 1992: 
David K. Isom, Esq. 
J. Preston Stieff, Esq. 
Suite 1680 Eaglegate Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1006 
/U€&~/ 
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081) 
PAUL E. DAME (5683) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, 
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900903522CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
filed on September 25, 1991. After an order granting plaintiff 
additional time to conduct discovery, dated February 10, 1992, 
defendants' Motion came on for hearing before the Court on June 
19, 1992, with David A. Anderson and Paul E. Dame appearing for 
the defendants. On June 18, 1992, the Court received a 
telecopied letter and Notice of Appearance Pro Se from plaintiff. 
In his letter, plaintiff requested the Court to postpone the 
hearing on defendants' Motion. After considering plaintiff's 
I ' O O H 
request, the Court noted that: (1) plaintiff is now representing 
himself; (2) plaintiff has not requested additional time to 
retain other counsel; and (3) there is no indication of when, if 
ever, plaintiff will be ready to attend a hearing on defendant's 
Motion. Accordingly, the Court elected to proceed with the hear-
ing on defendants' Motion. 
Having read defendants' supporting memorandum and affi-
davits, and now being fully advised in the premises, and the 
Court having issued its oral ruling granting defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
should be and is hereby granted; and 
2. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (breach of pub-
lic policy against discrimination against disabled), Third Cause 
of Action (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing), Fourth Cause of Action (breach of contract), and Fifth 
Cause of Action (infliction of emotional distress) should be and 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
-2-
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Entered this (U day of ^|U>K 1992 
BY THE COURT: 
li  l*JUy
HON. FRANK G. NOELw>f^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on this<££_ 
day of June, 1992. 
William V. Penney 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
PAUL E. DAME 
PED/061992A 
£/*£-< 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENNEY, WILLAIM V : 
PLAINTIFF, 
: SCHEDULING ORDER AND 
TRIAL NOTICE 
-VS- : 
CASE NO. 900903522 CV 
E-SYSTEMS, INC : 
: HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL 
DEFENDANT. 
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON AUGUST 3, 1992 
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED: 
1. THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MARCH 1, 1993 AT 10:00 A.M. 
2. ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 03 DAYS. 
3. THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO 
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY 
. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED 
SEPARATELY. 
4. ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY 
DEC 1, 1992 
5. ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY JAN 4, 1992 
6. EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY 
7. A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON 
FEBRUARY 22, 1993 AT 8:30 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR 
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE 
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE 
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE. 
8. FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT. 
9. THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS 
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY 
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE 
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING. 
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PERPARE AN 
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT'. /"^. 
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF .-AUGUST,' 1992. „ I ' / / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE 
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE. 
1)004-3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, 
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING: 
PENNEY, WILLIAM V. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
709 W. RUSK, SUITE A101 
P.O. BOX 11898 
ROCKWALL TX 75087 
ANDERSON, DAVID A. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
50 WEST BROADWAY #400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147 
DATED THIS 5 .\A DAY OF Clo If 19 <JX 
Lir c'«:r^. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
O00424 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
William V. Penney, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 900903522 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation, : 
David A. Williams and Alfred B. Buchanan, : 
Defendants. 
Now before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs 
second cause of action. The Court has reviewed the substantial materials submitted in 
connection with this Motion including memos, affidavits, news clippings, magazine articles and 
other matter submitted by the plaintiff and now rules as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff simply has not appropriately established in 
the record a question of fact on his second cause of action that would allow the Court to submit 
that matter to the jury. Plaintiff has conducted essentially no discovery and the materials 
submitted in opposition to the Motion do not appear to the Court to create questions of fact 
sufficient to overcome a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Much of the information contained in Mr. Penney's rather lengthy response is not 
information of which he has personal knowledge. The news clippings, magazine article, 
brochures and seminar advertisements of course are not admissible and do not in any way 
support Mr. Penney's claim. On the other hand several affidavits have been filed by the 
defendants which support their position both as to the fraud claims and their position that Mr. 
000533 
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Penney resigned from employment rather than being terminated. 
Throughout a large portion of this litigation Mr. Penney has not been represented by 
Counsel and the Court in recognition of that fact has given Mr. Penney the benefit of the doubt 
on occasions, has been patient in Mr. Penney's efforts to get his case prepared so that he could 
go to trial, but the Court feels that it simply must apply the rule of law in the final analysis that 
is applied to all litigants and must require that Mr. Penney establish in an appropriate manner 
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure facts on the record that establish a genuine issue 
of material facts. In the opinion of the Court Mr. Peimey's submittals in response to the 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment fails to do so. Accordingly, defendants' Motion is 
granted. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this U —tiay of February, 1993 
\ 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
uij07» »0 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this jin day of February, 1993. 
William V. Penney 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, Texas 75087 
David A. Anderson 
Paul E. Dame 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for Defendants 
P. O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY 
PLAINTIFF PRO SE 
2333 EAST CLIFT SWALLOW DRIVE 
SANDY, UT 84093 
, QK^T. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
William V. Penney, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
: CASE NO: 900903522 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
E-Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 
David A. Williams and Alfred B. Buchanan, 
Defendants. 
The Court in this matter has previously ruled granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on plaintiffs second cause of action stating that the plaintiff had not established a 
triable issue of fact. Mr. Penney had submitted news clippings, magazine articles, etc., but no 
affidavits or any other admissible evidence creating fact issues to submit to the jury. 
Subsequent to the Court's ruling on that matter and subsequent to it's preparation of it's 
Minute Entry granting the Motion for Summary Judgment the Court received from Mr. Penney 
certain other information including a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment together with William Penney's first 
Affidavit and an affidavit of Dr. Allen J. Meril. Even though the materials submitted by Mr. 
Penney are not allowed under our rules inasmuch as the moving parties reply memo (in this case 
the defendants' reply memo) is the final pleading to be filed in connection with its Motion, 
nevertheless the Court has reviewed Mr. Penney's materials and will permit their filing in 
connection with the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
After a review of Mr. Penney's affidavit the Court is still of the opinion that triable issue 
" O O D f i O 
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of fact has not been raised by Mr. Penney. Mr. Penney's affidavit contains certain paragraphs 
where Mr. Penney expresses his belief that he was terminated as a result of his refusal to engage 
in certain questionable activities at the company and as a result of informing management of 
certain questionable activities by other employees. These statements are purely conclusiory and 
Mr. Penney has offered no admissible evidence to support these conclusions. The Court is still 
of the opinion that Mr. Penney has not raised a triable issue of fact in this matter and 
considering all of the admissible evidence that Mr. Penney has established on the record it would 
still require the jury to purely speculate as to the reason for Mr. Penney's termination. 
Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its earlier ruling granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Dated this J ^ r f o y of February, 1993. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this / p day of February, 1993. 
William V. Penney 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, Texas 75087 
William V. Penney 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
David A. Anderson 
Paul E. Dame 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for Defendants 
P. O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
•'•rr:r\2 
DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081) 
PAUL E. DAME (5683) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • * • • • 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS ' 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware ) Civil No. 900903522CV 
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, ) 
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, ) 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendants. ) 
* • • • • • • • 
On December 31, 1992, defendants, through their attorney 
David A. Anderson, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 
plaintiff's second cause of action, all previous causes of action 
having been dismissed by the Court in response to defendants' prior 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After defendants filed their 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff William Penney, acting as 
attorney pro se. submitted materials, including an affidavit, in 
opposition to that Motion and defendants submitted a Reply 
oooc.o 
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Memorandum. The Court having reviewed the materials submitted by 
the parties that relate to defendants' Motion, and having issued 
its ruling on the Motion set forth in its Minute Entry dated 
February 16, 1993, and having issued its further ruling set forth 
in the Court's Minute Entry dated February 18, 1993, and being 
fully advised regarding the parties' positions on the subject 
Motion, and good cause appear therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be and is hereby granted and plaintiff's Second 
Cause of Action ("Violation of Public Policy Against Fraudulent 
Business Activities") is hereby dismissed wit£ prejudice, 
ENTERED this 7 day of / rj/f^C V v 1993 
BY THE COURT: ^ ' ^ 1 X' 
HON. FRANK G. NOEL 
-2- 000611 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following at the two 
addresses indicated on this ^ cO day of February, 1993: 
William V. Penney 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
William V. Penney 
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081) 
PAUL E. DAME (5683) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, 
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900903522CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
* * * * * * * * 
The Court having issued its Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 10, 1992, and having 
thereafter issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which Orders dismissed with prejudice all claims in 
plaintiff's Complaint herein against defendants, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff 
should be and is hereby entered, dismissing plaintiff's action, 
000^3 
including all claims asserted therein, with prejudice, As 
prevailing parties, defendants are awarded their costs herein. 
i s day of L ENTERED t h i s 1993 . 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to the 
following at the two addresses indicated on this ^/J day of 
February, 1993: 
William V. Penney 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
William V. Penney 
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
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DAVID A. ANDERSON (0081) 
PAUL E. DAME (5683) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
WILLIAM V. PENNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E-SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, DAVID A. WILLIAMS, 
ALFRED B. BUCHANAN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND STATEMENT OF 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE 
RECORD 
Civil No. 900903522CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendants' Motion To File Plaintiff's Deposition and to 
Modify the Judgment came on for hearing before the Court on July 9, 
1993. Plaintiff William V. Penney, who was present by telephone, 
represented himself, and Defendants were represented by David A. 
Anderson and Paul E. Dame of Parsons Behle & Latimer. At the 
hearing, through colloquy with counsel, the Court determined that 
counsel for defendants had inadvertently failed to file the 
63971 
original transcript of the deposition of the plaintiff, even though 
counsel had filed on September 25, 1991, their Motion to Publish 
the Plaintiff's Deposition, which was granted by the Court. The 
Court further determined that courtesy copies of the pages of the 
deposition relied upon by defendants were provided to the Court in 
connection with defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
It is the practice of the Court to consider the pages thus 
submitted prior to ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court is not inclined to use Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to deal with this situation. Rather, the 
Court, on its own initiative, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h), 
and in order to clarify what actually occurred in the trial court, 
makes this Statement and Order. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The original transcript of the Plaintiff's deposi-
tion may be filed as of July 9, 1993; 
2. The original transcript of the Plaintiff's deposi-
tion may be unsealed as previously provided by the Court's granting 
of the Defendants' September 25, 1991 Motion to Publish the 
Plaintiff's Deposition; 
3. Defendants' Motion under Rule 60(b) is denied; and 
63971 
4. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h), 
the record should be clarified to show that the original transcript 
of plaintiff's deposition was inadvertently not filed but that, in 
connection with their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
defendants provided the Court with courtesy copies of the pages of 
the Plaintiff's deposition on which they relied in support of chat 
Motion, and it is the Court's practice to review such deposition 
pages provided to it as courtesy copies in connection with its 
consideration of motions. 
This Order and Statement constitutes the Court's 
Statement pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and in accordance with that Rule, the parties now have 
10 days after the service of this signed Order and Statement to 
serve and file their objections, if any, to the preceding State-
ment. 
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ENTERED this ^ day of Ju 
BY THE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
l/A^S/£~y 
William V. Penney 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/ y r if. > — / 
David A. Anderson 
Paul E. Dame 
Counsel for Defendants 
« CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAI 
UTAH. ^ 
M 
EWUVf O D P TY COURT 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via federal 
express, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to the 
following at the indicated addresses on this I ' day of 
July, 1993: 
William V. Penney 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
fail v+~~i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to 
the following BRIEF OF APPELLEES and ADDENDUM thereto at the 
indicated addresses on this /O day of August, 1993: 
William V. Penney 
2333 East Cliff Swallow Drive 
Sandy, UT 84093 
William V, Penney 
709 West Rusk, Suite A101 
Rockwall, TX 75087 
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